Sandbagging Default Rules And Acquisition Agreements
 See Universal Enterprise Group, 2013 WL 3353743, at `15 (in The Knowledge that the buyer treated the alleged fraudulent representation of the seller with “healthy skepticism” and acquired it only after a renegotiated contract, in order to explicitly prove to the seller the risk that the presentation was wrong). But now, Justice Strine and his fellow Delaware Supreme Court judges have cast doubt on the state`s alleged default position. In Eagle Force Holdings, LLC v. Campbell, the majority (written by Justice Karen Valihura) and partially dissent (written by Chief Justice Strine) stated in Dicta that delaware`s standard sandbag rule was uncertain.  In a footnote, Valihura J.A. stated in his majority opinion that Delaware had “not yet resolved the interesting question” of “whether a party can recover in the event of a claim of injury if the parties know that certain [guarantees] were not true at the time of signing.”  In his dissent, the head of justice accepted Strine. He allegedly overlooked his own precedent, citing a more than 100-year-old case to support his assertion that “v]enerable Delaware Gesetz raises doubts about [the complainant`s purchaser`s] ability to claim damages” because the defendant made the complainant`s promises false.  In addition to Cobalt, a buyer may refer to California law and the “traditional” common law rule as evidence that a full pro-sandbag provision can destroy the “reasonable confidence” element of a fraud claim. As explained above, a buyer cannot claim a breach of an express guarantee under California law if the buyer knew that the presentation was wrong.  The purchaser must prove that he was reasonably based on representation (including an express representation in the contract).  In this way, a right to compensation in California is the same as a right to fraud in other states; The buyer must prove the reliability of both claims.
The principle of low-cost avoidance requires that the likelihood of litigation in a pro-sandbagging jurisdiction be lower.  It argues that the responsibility of the party best positioned to reduce risk must be borne at the lowest costs.  As sellers are more familiar with their business, they are better able to create accurate R-W at a lower cost.  A pro-bagging rule encourages sellers to use their superior knowledge to ensure that R-W is correct or that they are responsible. On the other hand, sellers will sometimes apply for an anti-sandbagging provision, which is a promotional provision that prevents the buyer from being compensated for the violation of any warranty or guarantee that the buyer was aware of before entering into the velvet agreement or the conclusion of the transaction. A typical “Anti-Sandbagging” provision may be as follows: This indication shows that a standard rule for sandbags is the most effective. It first unveiled previous sanction arguments by explaining the negotiation of a sandbag provision that does not reveal consistent information. Posner`s equation was then used to show that a standard rule for sandbags is more effective. A rule for financing sandbag lag has lower ex ante contractual costs because it gives the majority of parties what it would have negotiated for. It has a lower cost for preliminary proceedings and a lower likelihood of miscarriages of justice because it requires fewer judicial investigations. Finally, it has less likelihood of litigation since liability is imposed on the party who is best placed to mitigate it.
 Id. (“Although the defendants argue that it would be “tolerated fraud” to allow [the buyer] to enforce guarantees that he knew were false, the court considers that there is no foreigner to interpret the [acquisition agreement] in such a way that [the buyer] insisted on a toothless provision.”) Demanding buyers and buyers will often require a “sandbagging” provision (sometimes called a “pro-sandbagging” provision) that generally provides that the buyer has the right, after the farm